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ARTICLE
LAMENTING THE DISAPPEARANCE
OF PRAGMATISM :
SUBSIDIES LAW AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND
by Lara FRIEDLANDER*
L'adoption des Accords dits de la phase d'Uruguay démontre de façon
significative le passage du GATT de l'orientation pragmatique à l'approche
légaliste. Les subventions qui constituent un aspect de plus en plus controversé
du commerce international sont parmi les mesures affectées par ce changement
d'orientation. Ainsi, par exemple, au lieu de l'ancienne méthode dite de deux
voies, la légalité des subventions dans le cadre du GATT sera maintenant
établie principalement par des tests de spécificité et de préjudice. L'auteure
prétend que 1'Accord de la phase d'Uruguay portant sur les subventions aura
pour effet d'affaiblir le GATT, les pressions domestiques forçant les États à en
ignorer les dispositions. Elle suggère donc que la réforme du droit applicable
aux subventions aurait avantage à recourir à l'usage de la clause d'invalidation
ou d'affaiblissement des avantages tirés des concessions commerciales. Puisque
cette clause fait sentir la contrainte de la réciprocité, elle amène les États à se
comporter en prenant pour acquis que les autres États observent également
leurs engagements; du même coup, cette clause possède une légitimité
supérieure à celle des Accords de la phase d'Uruguay. Or, une telle légitimité
est cruciale lorsque la viabilité même de l'ordre juridique international dépend
de son respect par chacun des États.
                        
Lamenting the Disappearance
288 of Pragmatism : (1994-95) 25 R.D.U.S.
Subsidies Law After the Uruguay Round
Acceptance of the Uruguay Round Agreements marks a significant re-
orientation of the GATT from pragmatism to legalism. Not least among the
measures affected by this shift is subsidies, an increasingly controversial area
of trade law. Unlike the previous Track 1/ Track 2 method, GATT-legality of
subsidies will be now be determined primarily by specificity and injury tests.
This paper argues that the Uruguay Round Agreement on subsidies will
eventually undermine the GATT as domestic pressures force states to ignore
GATT rules. The paper goes on to suggest that subsidies law reform should
concentrate on encouraging the use of the nonviolation nullification and
impairment provision. As nonviolation nullification and impairment facilitates
reciprocity by regulating reliance-induced behaviour, its legitimacy is stronger
than that of the Uruguay Round Agreements. Such legitimacy is crucial when
the viability of an international legal order depends on self-enforcement.
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Hudec, «GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round :  An Unfinished Business», (1980)
13 Cornell Int'l L.J. 145.
3. R. Howse and M.J. Trebilcock, International Trade :  Legal Order and Political Economy,
(unpublished manuscript, 1993), c.1 at 36.
4. H.J. Cheetham, «The Federal Government Proposals for Reform of the GATT Dispute Settlement
System :  Continued Momentum for a Rules-Oriented Approach to Dispute Settlement in
International Trade Agreements», (1991) 22 R.G.D. 431 at 432.
5. V.C. Price, «New Institutional Developments in GATT», (1992) 1 Minn. J. Global Trade 87 at
90; R.E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law :  The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal
System, Salem, New Hampshire, Butterworth, 1993, at 362; R.Z. Lawrence & R.E. Litan, «The
World Trading System After the Uruguay Round», (1990) 8 Boston U. Int'l L.J. 247 at 251;
Howse and Trebilcock, supra, note 3, c. 15 at 28-9.
6. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations :
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 15 December, 1993, MTN/FA, UR-93-
0246  [Hereinafter «Uruguay Agreement»]. 
Introduction
Underlying the many battles that have been fought during the Uruguay
Round of negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)1
is one major theme :  the transformation of the GATT into a rules-oriented world
legal order.  The dialectic between a negotiation-oriented, pragmatist model and
a legalist, rules-oriented model has existed from the very inception of the
GATT2.  In 1950, the pragmatist model prevailed :  proposals for the Internatio-
nal Trade Organization (ITO) were defeated by American protection of state
sovereignty3.  The momentum of the legalist model has increased over the past
forty-five years4, as complaints of weakness in the GATT regime have
accumulated5.  Many of the elements of the Uruguay Round Agreements6, such
as the creation of an appelate body and the augmentation of surveillance
functions, reflect this trend.  
Acceptance of the Uruguay Round Agreement in December, 1993 marks a
profound re-orientation of the GATT.  This paper will argue against this
legalistic shift and will posit instead that the vision of the GATT as a diplomatic
instrument should have been strengthened.  It will assert these propositions in
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7. Subsidies complaints comprised approximately 38% of GATT litigation up to and including 1989.
Hudec, supra, note 5 at 339.
8. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of the Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (1980) 26 BISD 56; 31 U.S.T. 513; T.I.A.S. No. 9619
[hereinafter «Subsidies Code»].
9. J.H.J. Bourgeois, «The GATT Rules for Industrial Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in the
New GATT Round - The Weather and the Seeds» in The New GATT Round of Multilateral
Negotiations :  Legal and Economic Problems, E. Petersmann & M. Hilf (eds.), Deventer,
Netherlands,  Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1991, 219 at 231-2.
the context of subsidies, a contentious branch of GATT law which has spawned
many of the complaints referred to above7.  It will argue that the new agreement
on subsidies represents an attempt to impose a legalist framework on a mixture
of legalist and pragmatist substance.  Finally, this article will draw conclusions
from the application of the new approach to the subsidies context, and attempt
to generalize about the future of the GATT as a legal order.
Subsidies
a) Subsidies Law Before the Uruguay Round
Initially, the GATT provisions regarding subsidies were somewhat sparse.
Article VI of the GATT prohibited the use of any export subsidy, direct or
indirect, with the exception of subsidies for primary products.  Subsidies on
primary products only violated the GATT if they resulted in an inequitable share
of world trade.  There was no remedial provision other than Article XVI which
merely required notification and consultation.  
A more aggressive subsidies regime did not appear until the Tokyo Round.
The Subsidies Code8 was a compromise between two views on the regulation of
subsidies :  the «injury-only» school and the «anti-distortion» school9.   The
injury-only school contends that subsidies are not harmful by definition.  They
can help correct market distortions and support economic and political goals
which are distinct from economic efficiency.  Therefore trade remedies should
only be used when injury is caused to the domestic production industry of
another state.  The anti-distortion school reasons that all subsidies are bad
because they reduce productive and distributive efficiency.  The result of the
compromise between these two views was a two-track approach.  The first track,
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10. Article XI:3.
11. Bourgeois, supra, note 9 at 228.
12. Jackson, supra, note 2 at 19-20.
13. Article XI:1.
Article 4 of the Subsidies Code, allowed states to impose countervailing duties
on export subsidies, as long as the aggrieved party could show the existence of
a subsidy, material injury and a causal link between the subsidy and the injury.
In contrast, Article 11 merely allowed a state to request consultations with any
other party when an export subsidy existed or when any subsidy appeared to be
causing harm to a domestic industry.  No other specific remedial provisions
were contemplated.
  The two track approach to subsidies caused much concern among trade
theorists, as well as among the GATT's member states.  A basic source of
contention was the vagueness of the definition of a subsidy.  The GATT divided
subsidies into countervailable export subsidies and other subsidies, but gave no
definition of either term.  A list in the Annex to the Code prohibited certain
subsidization schemes such as direct subsidies contingent upon export
performance and currency retention schemes involving export bonuses, but the
list was merely «illustrative and non-exhaustive»10.  The GATT had developed
a fairly effective legal framework for export subsidies11, yet had been unable to
find an equivalent principle for domestic subsidies.  The reason for this is clear:
it is difficult to discover a legitimate domestic policy justification for an export
subsidy.  However, many domestic subsidies have legitimate policy justifica-
tions :  long-term economic stability, infant industries, religious preferences,
lifestyle preferences and preservation of traditional work patterns are just a few
examples12.  The legitimacy of domestic subsidies is recognized in the very text
of the General Agreement.  Although Article XVI notes that domestic subsidies
can be harmful to other states' interests and distort trade, it also states that
domestic subsidies are «widely used as important instruments for the promotion
of social and economic policy objectives such as employment sustenance,
restructuring of certain economic sectors and re-training»13.  According to
Depayre and Petriccione, the intellectual difficulty of finding an umbrella
principle which covers an almost endless variety and degree of government
policies and the diversity of political attitudes on what should be considered a
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14. G. Depayre and R. Petriccione, «Definition of Subsidy» in Subsidies and International Trade :
A European Lawyers' Perspective, J.H.J. Bourgeois (ed.), Deventer, the Netherlands, Kluwer Law
and Taxation Publishers, 1991, 67.
15. Hudec, supra, note 5 at 345.
16. Lawrence & Litan, supra, note 5 at 252.
17. Hudec, supra, note 5 at 338-9, 346-7 and 355.
18. Ibid. at 355.  Note that «AD» refers to «Anti-Dumping».
19. G.C. Hufbauer and J.S. Erb, Subsidies in International Trade, Washington, Institute for
International Economics, 1984, at 112-3.
20. J.M. Finger, «That Old GATT Magic No More Casts Its Spell (How the Uruguay Round Failed)»,
(1991) 25:2 J. World Trade 19 at 20.
legitimate subsidy have resulted in an inability to define an actionable subsidy14.
Despite the widespread use of subsidies world-wide, the number of rulings
against subsidies has been remarkably low15.  The lack of clarity of a definition
of subsidies has made an effective regulation regime impossible and has
significantly decreased incentives to reduce or eliminate subsidies.
A second criticism of the current approach to subsidies centers on the
GATT's dispute settlement mechanism.  One consequence of the Track 1/Track
2 approach has been excessive reliance on countervailing duties (CVDs)16.
Although there have been numerous complaints concerning countervailing
duties, particularly in the past decade, the success rate of these complaints, both
in terms of panel decisions and settlements, has been extremely low17.  Hudec
has speculated that CVD cases are inherently more likely to fail given the
«typical arbitrariness of AD/CVD criteria and the legal rigidity of measures once
taken»18.
CVDs themselves are not inherently undesirable remedies.  With attention
to overcompensation, a countervailing duty is often preferable to other trade
remedies such as export taxes and export quotas which may increase trade
distortion.  As Hufbauer and Erb suggest, «the remedy can prove worse than the
original subsidy»19.  In fact, the use of CVDs by the United States has resulted
in trade liberalization in that the removal of foreign trade barriers outnumbered
American retaliatory restrictions20.
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21. K. Kautzor-Schroder, «Subsidies and Countervail in the Uruguay Round :  A Comment» in The
New GATT Round of Multilateral Negotiations :  Legal and Economic Problems, E. Petersmann
and M. Hilf (eds.), Deventer, Netherlands, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1991, 237 at
239.
22. Subsidies Code, supra, note 8, art. 4(4).
23. Finger, supra, note 20 at 20.
24. W.P. Meng, «Comment» in Subsidies and International Trade :  A European Lawyers'
Perspective, J.H.J. Bourgeois (ed.), Deventer, the Netherlands, Kluwer Law and Taxation
Publishers, 1991, 175 at 177.
25. Lawrence & Litan, supra, note 5 at 253.
Rather, it is the unilateral nature of past usage of countervailing duties which
has caused concern21.  Under Track 1, a state could impose countervailing duties
without prior authorization from a GATT panel22.  Thus, barring a GATT
complaint, the content and frequency of application of countervailing duty law
is determined entirely by domestic legislation.  The result is a debilitation of the
GATT.  Since CVDs bring domestic control within GATT-legality, they «have
a magic all their own»23, reducing or eliminating the incentive to use multilateral
GATT procedures.  As Meng states, Track 1 was «more predictable, timely and
effective»24.  Therefore, although Track 1 and Track 2 were not mutually
exclusive options, the incentive for strong economies to negotiate through the
GATT was all but destroyed.  
Futhermore, although Track 1 mechanisms were available to all members
of the GATT, realistically they were only available to economically powerful
states.  For example, threats by Madagascar to reduce American access to the
Madagascar market would not be terribly effective.  Even the possibility of using
countervailing duties against economic powerhouses can result in other types of
trade restraints, such as voluntary export restrictions (VERs) or orderly
marketing arrangements (OMRs).  The result is that some states, particularly
developing ones, see the countervailing duty as a new form of non-tariff
barrier25.
Finally, not only did the Track 1/Track 2 system weaken the GATT and limit
effective remedies to strong economies, it provided remedies for only a portion
of all subsidies.  Subsidies can be categorized into different groups according to
their distortionary effects.  A can subsidize its exports into B, thereby harming
B's domestic producers.  A can subsidize its exports into C, thereby displacing
Lamenting the Disappearance
296 of Pragmatism : (1994-95) 25 R.D.U.S.
Subsidies Law After the Uruguay Round
26. Bourgeois, supra, note 9 at 229.
27. Uruguay Round Agreement, supra, note 6, art. 3.
28. J.J. Barceló, «Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping after the Tokyo Round», (1980)
13 Cornell Int. L. J. 257 at 282-285.
29. Uruguay Round Agreement, supra, note 6, art. 8.2(a).
B's producers who also export to C.  A can subsidize its domestic industries,
thereby harming B's producers who export to A.  Of these three types of
subsidies, only the first type was countervailable under the Subsidies Code.  The
other types had to be pursued through Track 2.  Thus, as Bourgeois argues,
«while the importing contracting party can protect itself by countervailing
measures, other contracting parties whose exporting interests may be affected
are left out in the cold»26.
Given the gravity of these problems, it is no surprise that the Subsidies Code
never received much support from GATT members :  as of June 1989 only 24
states (the EC countries being one state) had signed on to the agreement.
b) The Uruguay Round
The Uruguay Round Agreement categorizes subsidies into «prohibited»,
«actionable» and «non-actionable» groups (also known as the white/grey/black
or green/amber/red approach).  Prohibited subsidies include listed export
subsidies, subsidies contingent upon export performance or local sourcing and
other subsidies such as some of the ones listed in the Code's Annex which are
obviously intended to give aid to exports27.  The rationale here is that such
subsidies betray motives of trade distortion rather than legitimate domestic
policy actualization28.  Non-actionable subsidies are at the opposite end of the
spectrum, being those subsidies which cannot be attacked with trade remedies.
These are subsidies which are generally available (not «specific») or which are
identified by the Agreement as non-actionable, such as some research and
development activity29.  Determination of whether or not a subsidy will be
specific will be done through the application of a specificity test of the type
currently used in the United States.  If a subsidy is deemed specific, then it will
be actionable.  A subsidy is specific if it is overtly so (i.e. if the legislation is
clearly targetting specific enterprises or industries), if it is theoretically available
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30. Ibid., art. 2.1.
31. Ibid., art. 5.1.
32. Ibid., art. 4 and 7.
33. Ibid., art. 19.
34. J. Jackson, «Strengthening the International Legal Framework of the GATT-MTN System :
Reform Proposals for the New GATT Round» in The New GATT Round of Multilateral
Negotiations :  Legal and Economic Problems, E. Petersmann and M. Hilf (eds.), Deventer,
Netherlands, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1991, 3 at 7-8. 
to everyone but in fact only used by a few producers or if government discretion
indicates that certain producers have been targetted30. 
  In the middle category are actionable subsidies.  A subsidy will be deemed
actionable if it is specific and causes «adverse effects» to other states.  Adverse
effects are defined as :
«(a) injury to the domestic industry of another signatory
(b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly
to other Members under the GATT 1994, in particular the benefits of
concessions bound under Article II of the GATT 1994
(c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.»31
Should a state believe that a prohibited or actionable subsidy is causing harm
to its domestic producers, it can take one of two approaches.  The state may
request consultations and, if the consultations fail, may request consideration by
a panel32.  Unilateral action in the form of a countervailing duty is also available
to the complainant state, so long as the complainant member has made
reasonable attempts at consultations and so long as the subsidized imports are
causing injury33.
There is one distinctly positive element of the Uruguay Round Agreement.
Clarification of the definition of subsidies reduces the uncertainty of possible
unilateral or multilateral response.  In contrast to the vague thresholds of the
Subsidies Code, the tests in the Agreement are specific enough to enable
governments and economic actors to plan at least some subsidization without
fear of trade retaliation34.  Fears over the possible vulnerability of broad social
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35. Uruguay Round Agreement, supra, note 6, art. 12.1.
36. Bourgeois, supra, note 9 at 221.
37. As noted above, the preamble and article 8.1 of the Subsidies Code state that «subsidies are used
by governments to promote important objectives of national policy».
38. Howse & Trebilcock, supra, note 3, c. VI at 31.
39. Jackson, supra, note 2 at 251; M. Trebilcock, «Throwing Deep :  Trade Remedy Laws in a First-
Best World» in M.J. Trebilcock and R.C. York (eds.), Fair Exchange, Toronto, C.D. Howe
Institute, 1990, 235 at 242.
40. See chapter 1, pp. 3-5 in Howse & Trebilcock, supra, note 3.
policies such as health care or education should be alleviated and even the fear
of unilateral trade remedies should be somewhat decreased in view of the
opportunity to present evidence35.
  However, the classification system proposed in the Uruguay Round
Agreement does not clearly address the underlying, more complex issue in
subsidies law :  the determination of the «legitimacy» of a domestic subsidy by
an international tribunal.  The crux of the problem is this :  domestic subsidies
are important if not crucial aspects of domestic politics36.  This has long been
acknowledged by the GATT itself37.  An international organization which
purports to regulate domestic subsidies therefore must have some basis for
determining which subsidies are legitimate and which subsidies should be
exposed to retaliation.  Normally, the GATT is competent to make decisions
based on basic trade theory.  Trade theory reasons that subsidies cause economic
distortions.  They transfer production from efficient to inefficient producers,
thereby raising the price consumers pay for products38.  Consumers lose again
because they must pay tax dollars to fund subsidies.  It has been suggested that
states which import subsidized goods should send a «thank-you note» to the
exporting state39.  Since comparative advantage tells us that free trade is always
more beneficial to trading states than distorted trade40, a GATT panel could
make a legitimacy decision based on its own area of expertise :  trade theory and
practice.
However, as with other areas of trade law (such as intellectual property),
trade theory can be an inadequate basis for decision-making regarding domestic
subsidies.  It is not clear, for example, that an unelected international panel with
no expertise outside trade law should decide whether or not to strike down a
subsidy which affects a product's price by a relatively small smount, yet achieves
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41. Kautzor-Schroder, supra, note 21 at 240-1.
42. Hudec, supra, note 2 at 150.
43. Jackson, supra, note 2 at 267.
a significant national objective, such as enabling a traditional community to
maintain its historical way of life.  If states could agree on a list of legitimate
subsidies, the institutional competence of a GATT panel would not be in doubt.
Yet, as Kautzor-Schroder suggests, it is unlikely that states would be able to
agree on such a list41.  Hudec has stated that 
«The regulatory impact of GATT rules has rested on the normative force of
organized community condemnation.  The key to the force of such normative
pressures is an underlying consensus among GATT member governments about
what constitutes correct governmental behavior.»42
Given the difficulty of reaching consensus on the legitimacy of a particular
subsidy, the force of a panel decision is thus reduced.
The Agreement's response to this problem is puzzling.  First, the heart of the
Agreement, the categorization of prohibited, non-actionable and actionable
subsidies, amounts to a legal framework which presupposes that the legitimacy
of subsidies can be definitively determined.  At first glance the fact that most
contentious subsidies could be actionable makes the Agreement's categorization
uncontroversial.  However, a closer look shows that even this apparently
uncontroversial attempt to impose legal rules on subsidies is problematic.  For
example, a subsidy which is partially contingent on use of domestic goods over
imported goods will be prohibited by article 3.1(b) regardless of the subsidy's
potential positive domestic economic, social or political impact.  
The use of the specificity test to determine which subsidies are non-
actionable is questionable as well.  The decision to label non-specific subsidies
as non-actionable is intuitively sensible as such subsidies normally do not
produce significant distortion43.  However, this goal can be accomplished by
simply requiring a minimum level of adverse effects of a subsidy before a GATT
panel will consider authorization of retaliation or other measures.  This approach
is already embodied in article 5.1 of the Agreement.  Furthermore, specificity
is not always a guarantee that protectionist interests are at work.  For example,
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44. A.D. Anderson, «An Analysis of the Proposed Subsidies Code Procedures in the `Dunkel Text'
of the GATT Uruguay Round :  The Canadian Exporters' Case», (1993) 27 J. of World Trade 71.
Anderson acknowledges that the Dunkel Draft attempts to account for differences in the extent
of diversification of economic activities, yet is skeptical about its implementation.  See text at 74-
5.
45. Jackson, supra, note 2 at 267-8.
46. Uruguay Round Agreement, supra, note 6, art. 7.8.
47. Ibid.
the United States imposed countervailing duties on Canadian softwood lumber
in 1986.  However, the fact that Canadian firms have supported lower stumpage
fees than those in effect in the United States may have only been a reflection of
Canada's industrial structure44.  Jackson suggests that there is another justifica-
tion for specificity.  Specificity eliminates from the trade regulation arena
policies, such as health care, policing and education which we intuitively believe
should be excluded from its scope45.  Thus the specificity test, as it is applied to
determine which subsidies are non-actionable, is also a legitimacy test.  This
type of test is of particular concern given the possibility of unilateral retaliation.
Second, the same legalistic approach to legitimacy occurs in article 5 of the
Agreement which addresses actionable subsidies.  As said above, article 5.1
states that a subsidy is actionable if it causes injury, nullification and impairment
and serious prejudice to another signatory.  Should a subsidy satisfy these
criteria, the Agreement states that the offending state «shall take appropriate
steps to remove such adverse effects or shall withdraw the subsidy»46.  If the
subsidy is not removed within 6 months, then the Committee on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures will authorize countermeasures47.  Thus the Agreement
represents a rejection of the Tokyo Round Track 2 conciliation approach in
favour of specific rules which can determine with some certainty the legality of
a subsidy.  The Agreement is overt in its legalistic approach and does not betray
any sense of institutional incompetence.  Note the almost constitutional tone of
the phrase «No signatory should cause...adverse effects to the interests of other
signatories» in article 5.1.
It is my argument that the Agreement's legalistic approach to subsidies will
be harmful to the future of GATT.  Even well-drafted rules may be ignored at
times.  A state may choose to ignore international rules for two reasons.  First,
domestic needs are sometimes more important than international obligations.
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48. R.E. Hudec, «GATT or GABB?  The Future Design of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
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Dordrecht, Martinus Nijoff Publishers, 1985, at 64.  See also Price, supra, note 5; Carlson, supra,
note 2 at 1197-99.
51. Lutz, supra, note 2 at 113-4.
A government may ignore the GATT in favour of finding solutions to serious
domestic problems.  As Hudec points out, 
«Trade restrictions are the product of underlying economic problems, and they
are "inevitable" as long as the problems are not solved.  The mere existence of
rules will not make these economic subsidies disappear, nor will rules promote
the kind of discussion needed to understand and solve them.»48
The GATT may also be ignored by governments which face severe domestic
political pressure from certain industries, interest groups or political parties49.
The controversy in Canada during the 1988 election over the Free Trade
Agreement and its potential impact on Canadian jobs is but one example of the
strength of anti-free trade domestic pressure.  Although an international
regulatory system will exert some external pressure on governments50 it is
inevitable that without an enforcement mechanism bound to happen these two
types of domestic pressure will sometimes prevail over the GATT.
Given that even well-crafted rules will undoubtedly be disregarded by
individual states at times, an excessively legalistic GATT will eventually lose
its effectiveness.  If the sole reason why GATT members used subsidies in the
past was the vagueness of the Tokyo Round reforms, then the more precise
Uruguay Round Agreement would be more effective in eliminating subsidies.
However, as Lutz has argued, the implicit assumption of legalism that faulty
rules are responsible for protectionism is incorrect since violations of the GATT
are more likely to take place in reaction to economic problems and not before
economic problems appear51.  As it is inevitable that GATT members will
sometimes ignore the General Agreement, then making the General Agreement
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more detailed or more strict will not improve compliance and certainty, and will
only accentuate the rejection of the Agreement.  Repeated evasion of GATT
rules would weaken the legitimacy of the GATT itself.  As long as the GATT
does not have its own enforcement mechanism, it must seek to find rules which
achieve some certainty without encumbering itself with the risks of constitutio-
nal pretensions.  I will argue below that the concept of nullification and
impairment realizes this goal.  
Nullification and Impairment
The GATT provision on nullification and impairment is found in Article
XXIII.  It states, in part :
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit
accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being
nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the
Agreement is being impeded as a result of
(a)  the failure of another contracting party to carry out
its obligations under this Agreement, or
(b)  the application by another contracting party of any
measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions
of this Agreement, or
(c)  the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of
the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other
contracting party of parties which it considers to be concerned...
2.  If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting
parties within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type
described in paragraph 1(c) of this Article, the matter may be referred
to the CONTRACTING PARTIES.  The CONTRACTING PARTIES
shall promptly investigate the matter...and shall make appropriate
recommendations...If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the
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Trade Practices :  The New Section 301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment», (1975) 59
Minn. L.R. 461 for a review of the drafting history of XXIII:1(b).
circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may
authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any
other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obliga-
tions under this Agreement.
Nonviolation nullification and impairment (Article XXIII:1(b)) is different
from the rest of the GATT in that it represents a distinctly pragmatic approach
to trade regulation.  Unlike violation nullification and impairment in XXIII:1(a),
1(b) contemplates compensation or reaction to a trade measure without the
categorization of that measure as GATT-illegal52.  Because of its emphasis on
compensation rather than punishment53, it seeks not to judge state conduct, but
to preserve trade relationships by emphasizing equity and predictability.  It is
this emphasis, it will be argued, that makes Article XXIII:1(b) a desirable
alternative to the Uruguay Round approach to subsidies.  
a) Summary of the Law of Article XXIII:1(b)
On its face, 1(b) appears too broad to be effective.  This has certainly been
a complaint of many commentators54.  Certainly the jurisprudence has been
sparse.  Of the 26 complaints which put 1(b) forward as a ground up until the
end of 1989, a detailed analysis of 1(b) was only made ten times. However, it is
submitted that this jurisprudence is sufficient to provide an analytical basis for
subsidy complaints which currently fall under 1(b), as well as a basis for
expansion of the application of this concept to all subsidy questions.
Early GATT panels developed a two-pronged test to determine whether
nonviolation nullification and impairment had occurred.  The first prong of the
test is whether or not the complainant party had a «reasonable expectation» that
the impugned trade measure would not be introduced.  The second prong of the
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56. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, vol. 2,
Geneva, GATT, 1952, at 188-196.
57. (1955) 3 BISD 77.
test examines whether or not the trade measure has significantly changed
competitive conditions.  Evidence of material injury is not necessary.  This
analytical framework was established in a 1949 complaint by Chile against
Australian subsidies on ammonium sulphate.  During World War II, Australia
subsidized both sodium nitrate and ammonium sulfate.  Australia then
negotiated a tariff concession with Chile on sodium nitrate.  In 1949 Australia
lifted the subsidy on sodium nitrate but continued the subsidy on ammonium
sulphate.  The result was that Australian ammonium sulphate absorbed Chile's
sodium nitrate market.  The Working Party stated that the actions of the
Australian government «could not reasonably have been anticipated» by Chile
and, moreover, that Chile «had reason to assume» that the subsidy on ammo-
nium sulphate would not be removed before the removal of subsidies on other
products55.  The Working Party was careful to state that the reasonable
expectation would not apply to all subsidies; it was applied because the two
products were so similar and the initiation and implementation history of the
subsidies on each product was equally similar.  
In the Norwegian Sardines case56, Norway and Germany had negotiated
tariff concessions in 1951 on Scandinavian sardines.  However, soon after the
tariff concession, Germany granted more favourable treatment to Portugese
sardines.  The GATT panel supported Norway's claim of nullification and
impairment on the grounds that Germany's actions had «substantially reduced»
the value of Norway's concessions and that Norway had reason to believe that
its product would not be treated less favourably than products from other states.
The panel held that Norway's expectations were reasonable because equality of
treatment was discussed during the tariff negotiations and that tariff concessions
were in fact exchange.
The framework established in the Ammonium Sulphate and Norwegian
Sardines cases has been vigorously affirmed.  In the Import Duties on Starch
and Potato Flour case, a GATT panel found that Benelux tariff concessions to
Germany were undermined by Germany's failure to carry out its obligations57.
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60. See Hudec, supra, note 48 at 1374-5.
61. Supra, note 55 at 194.
62. E.-U.Petersmann, «Violation Complaints and Non-violation Complaints in Public International
Trade Law», (1991) German Yearbook of Int'l Law 175 at 227.  This sentiment was also echoed
in the Oilseeds case, below, where the panel wrote that «[t]he recognition of the legitimacy of an
expectation relating to the use of production subsidies therefore in no way prevents a contracting
party from using production subsidies consistently with the General Agreement; it merely
A 1955 report by a GATT Working Party affirmed the principle that GATT
members which have negotiated concessions under Article II have, absent
evidence to the contrary, a reasonable expectation that the value of their
concessions will not be impaired by subsequent trade measures58.  Attempts by
the European Economic Community to weaken the jurisprudential value of the
Norwegian Sardines case and the Ammonium Sulphate case have been squarely
rejected by GATT panels59.  More general use of nullification and impairment
has received some support among academics as well60.
The two early cases are an explicit rejection of fault-based judgment by
GATT panels.  In the Ammonium Sulphate case, Australia's policy was intended
to support sugar farmers by increasing their income through the subsidization of
ammonium sulphate.  The panel report recognized the legitimacy of the policy,
and specifically stated that it had 
«no intention of implying that the action taken by the Australian Government
was unreasonable, but simply that the Chilean Government could not have
reasonably been expected during the negotiations in 1947 to have foreseen such
action or the reasons which led to it.»61
Furthermore, although the panel recommended a change in Australia's subsidy
policy as the most practical solution, it emphasized that its power was limited
to the authorization of compensatory trade measures on the part of Chile.  The
panel was careful to respect Australia's sovereignty and not to substitute its own
policy determinations.  As Petersmann states, «the GATT rules on nonviolation
complaints rightly recognize the various «GATT freedoms» of contracting
parties to introduce trade measures not prohibited by GATT even if they nullify
and impair the competitive benefit of previous trade concessions»62.  This
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63. GATT/CP.5/SR.6 (6 November 1950).
64. M.N. Sills, «The Concept of Non-Violation Nullification and Impairment in the Investment and
Services Chapters of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement», (1990) 3 R.I.B.L. 127.
65. (1963) 11 BISD 95.
66. Sills, supra, note 64 at 134.
respect for sovereignty is perhaps reflected in the fact that although Australia
wrote a dissenting opinion, the panel report was adopted by the contracting
parties in March of 195063.
Mark Sills64 has argued that the spirit of Norwegian Sardines and Ammo-
nium Sulphate has been significantly diluted by more recent GATT panel
decisions, especially the series of complaints launched by Uruguay in 196165.
The complaints were directed at 15 different countries with respect to 30
different products or groups of products, including a complaint added on later
against the European Economic Community's CAP (the Common Agricultural
Policy).  However, Uruguay's position was remarkably unclear.  No specific
legal theory was enunciated, with the exception of one reference to Article
XIII:1(c).  No statistical information was provided to the panel.  Uruguay did not
even specify which type of retaliation it wished the panel to authorize.  The
panel gave recommendations for certain violations of the GATT which had been
admitted by the defendant states, yet refused to give any ruling on the subject of
nonviolation nullification and impairment.
Sills argues that the Uruguay case indicates a «decidedly more conservative
approach to the issue of the effect of impairment of the benefits of a GATT
concession without actual breach of a GATT obligation» because the panel
«demonstrated some reluctance to make use of [the concept of nonviolation
nullification and impairment] without proof based on statistical or other
evidence of trade impairment»66.  Yet it is hardly surprising that a GATT panel
would refuse to make a ruling without any specific legal argumentation or
evidence.  Surely the Uruguay complaints are not a signal of a decline in the
potency of Article XXIII, but rather represent the analytical rigor expected by
GATT panels.
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b) Effectiveness of Article XXIII:1(b)
It is my argument that nonviolation nullification and impairment is a more
effective legal tool in the international context than more legalist processes.  I
base this statement on two principles.  The first principle is that nonviolation
nullification and impairment facilitates dialogue and negotiation.  This is
illustrated by three controversial GATT cases :  Canned Fruit, Citrus and
Oilseeds.
In the 1981 Canned Fruit complaint, the United States opposed a subsidy to
EC producers based on the calculation of the difference in the selling price of
domestic and imported processed fruit (a part of the EC's Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP)).  The panel found that the subsidy constituted nonviolation
nullification and impairment, rejecting the EC defence that XXIII:1(b) required
proof of causation67.  However, the panel report was never adopted, in part due
to the EC's objection to the panel's decision on proof of causation, and the
Canned Fruit case is now cited by some as evidence of the GATT's failure as an
effective legal instrument.68  
The panel report in the Citrus case69 was also blocked from adoption.  In that
case, the United States lodged a complaint regarding EC tariff preferences to
citrus fruits from certain Mediterranean countries pursuant to a series of trade
agreements negotiated in the 1960s and 1970s.  The crux of the dispute was the
question of whether the Mediterranean agreements constituted regional trade
blocs in conformity with Article XXIV.  The panel chose not to address the
GATT-legality of the agreements directly, ruling instead, in an extremely long
and convoluted report, that American benefits had been nullified and impaired
by the preferences.  The result was EC blockage of adoption of the report by the
Council and a series of tariff increases by the United States and the EC over the
coming months.  Like the Canned Fruit case, the Citrus case was a highly
visible example of the apparent failure by the GATT to regulate trade relations
effectively70.
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The last case in the trilogy is the Oilseeds case, an action initiated by the
United States in 1988 against EC subsidies to oilseed crushing mills.  The
United States and the EC had negotiated a series of tariff concessions, including
tariffs on oilseeds, at the time of the creation of the CAP in the early 1960s. 
However, in the mid-1980s, the EC increased its output of subsidized oilseeds.
The panel ruled that the subsidies constituted both a violation of Article III: 4
of the GATT and nonviolation nullification and impairment.  The EC registered
reservations to the ruling, but did not block its adoption in January of 1990,
pledging to work toward removal of the subsidies in the future71.  In late 1991
the EC redirected the subsidies from crushing mills to oilseed farmers.  The
United States initiated another GATT complaint.  Again the panel ruled that
nonviolation nullification and impairment was occurring, but this time the EC
blocked adoption of the report72.  Negotiations between the United States and
the EC continued into the fall of 1992 at which point the United States declared
a discriminatory tariff on various EC imports.  The case seems to have been
settled by an exchange of concessions during the Uruguay Round.  
Are these three cases fatal to the concept of nullification and impairment?
It is my argument that Canned Fruit, Citrus and Oilseeds actually represent the
success of nonviolation nullification and impairment as a trade regulation tool.
In all three cases, the results of a violation ruling would have had an enormous
impact.  In Canned Fruit, a ruling by the panel in favour of the United States
would have endangered the entire Common Agricultural Policy73.  In Citrus, a
ruling by the panel in favour of the United States would have endangered all
preferential tariff arrangements between the EC and Mediterranean states74.  In
Oilseeds, a huge market for oilseeds was in issue75.  Although these two
arrangements may well have been GATT-illegal, they were complex, deliberate,
important domestic policy.  The European Community was not prepared to
accept the domestic consequences of the destruction of these policies; political
pressure was already strong enough to induce the EC to block adoption of
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findings of nonviolation nullification and impairment.  By choosing to rule on
nonviolation nullification and impairment rather than on specific violations, the
panel rulings gave some legitimacy to American retaliation, increasing external
pressure on the EC to take action and avoiding the anarchy of auto-interpreta-
tion.  Yet by not forcing the EC to make a clear choice between GATT legality
and its domestic policies, the rulings also enabled the EC to «save face» and
gave the Community more room to negotiate.  All three cases were eventually
settled.  Considering the immense impact of the policies at stake, the role of the
GATT in promoting their settlement should be upheld as one of qualified
success rather than total failure.  Perhaps this success would not have been
achieved had the panels loudly proclaimed the GATT-illegality of Europe's
policies76.  
A good example of the consequences of more judgmental GATT rulings is
the DISC case.  Here, the European Community claimed that American tax laws
amounted to export subsidies.  The panel found a violation of article XVI:477 yet
their finding was followed by years of litigation, consultation and retaliation.
Although the panel report was finally adopted in November of 1981 (five years
later), total compliance never occurred.  The case has been thus described as
«the largest and most conspicuous failure in the history of GATT litigation»78.
Authors such as Hudec have argued that the panel's violation ruling may have
actually been harmful to the negotiations because it served to make the
bargaining positions of both parties more rigid79.  
Canned Fruit, Citrus and Oilseeds show that nonviolation nullification and
impairment can facilitate implementation of GATT goals with less risk than
Lamenting the Disappearance
310 of Pragmatism : (1994-95) 25 R.D.U.S.
Subsidies Law After the Uruguay Round
80. R.E. Hudec, «Retaliation Against «Unreasonable» Foreign Trade Practices :  The New Section
301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment», (1975) 59 Minn. L.R. 461 at 487.
81. Supra, note 57.  As described above, the Benelux states lodged a complaint against Germany,
arguing that Germany had not lived up to its commitment to reduce specific tariffs.  These
commitments included concessions in the formal tariff schedule as well as a letter from the
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violation litigation.  However, nonviolation nullification and impairment also
enjoys a principled justification which more legalistic rules do not.  Article
XXIII:1(b) protects reliance interests.  As Hudec explains,
«The purpose of the nullification and impairment remedy is to preserve the
balance of the original exchange of values.  If a particular disadvantageous
measure is foreseen, the country receiving concessions will be able to discount
the possibility in advance by paying a lesser value for the concessions affected.
If that is so, then the actual occurrence of the foreseen disadvantage will not
upset the balance, for it already will have been taken into account.  Conversely,
if the disadvantageous measure is not anticipated, the country receiving the
concessions is more likely to pay full value and thus to suffer an imbalance
when the commercial advantage is later reduced.»80 [emphasis in original]
Reasonable expectations are based on the behaviour of states themselves.  Most
of the cases refer to expectations derived from negotiated tariff concessions, but
the panel in the German Import Duties on Starch case held that expectations
could originate from official diplomatic acts as well81.  Since reasonable
expectations are based on the behaviour of states themselves, it is states which
establish normative boundaries of their behaviour, not substantive GATT rules.
Since the values at stake in nonviolation nullfication and impairment litigation
are the consistency and reliability of the diplomatic conduct of GATT members
rather than the validity of the substance of their policies, a GATT panel decision
on nonviolation nullification and impairment increases legitimacy.  Compliance
with past trade concessions is essential to the continued existence of the GATT.
A GATT panel, as the representative body of the member states and as a body
with expertise in GATT law, is the most appropriate arena for determining
whether or not compliance with previous concessions has occurred.  This sense
of legitimacy was articulated in the first Oilseeds panel ruling :
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«[contracting parties] must therefore be assumed to base their tariff negotiations
on the expectation that the price effect of the tariff concessions will not be
systematically offset.  If no right of redress were given to them in such a case
they would be reluctant to make tariff concessions and the General Agreement
would no longer be useful as a legal framework for incorporating the results of
trade negotiations.»82
Therefore the theoretical justification for nonviolation nullification and
impairment is much more pragmatic than realistic.  Under Article XXIII:1(b),
the GATT is not a set of normative rules regarding legitimate international
behaviour, but a set of procedures to induce negotiations and ensure their
effectiveness.  Considering the difficulty of finding legal rules to regulate
subsidies, the pragmatism of nonviolation nullification and impairment is a
preferable approach to the subsidies question.
Nullification and Impairment and the Uruguay Round Agreement
At first glance, the Agreement appears to support the use of nonviolation
nullification and impairment to regulate subsidies.  As mentioned above, article
5.1 lists nullification and impairment of benefits as one of three indicators of an
actionable subsidy.  The footnote to article 5.1(b) states that nullification and
impairment «shall be established in accordance with the practice of application
of Article XXIII:1(b) of the General Agreement»83.  Thus a plausible interpreta-
tion is that a subsidy will be actionable when it could not have been reasonably
expected by the complaining state and when it alters the balance of benefits and
obligations between states.
However, under article 5.1, injury and serious prejudice to member states
also indicate an actionable subsidy.  Injury and serious prejudice are legal rules
in the more classic sense.  The «injury test» has been called a «pillar of trade
policy»84 and has long been used in the antidumping context85  The injury test
maintains that a subsidy on exports will be actionable if it causes material injury
Lamenting the Disappearance
312 of Pragmatism : (1994-95) 25 R.D.U.S.
Subsidies Law After the Uruguay Round
86. Articles XVI and VIII respectively.
87. Uruguay Round Agreement, supra, note 6, articles 6.1 and 6.4.
88. Jackson, supra, note 2 at 263.
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«constitutional» status.  Even jus cogens norms (transcendent, immutable norms) in public
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Note, of course, that there are significant costs to withdrawing from the GATT structure; it is my
argument that it is avoidance of these costs that drive adherence to trade rules and not theoretical
principles which would be relied upon to drive a more constitutional structure.
to the domestic producers of a like product.  If the subsidy can be shown to
cause material injury, then article 11.2 of the Agreement allows the complainant
state to impose countervailing duties.  Serious prejudice is a broader indicator
which focusses on effect more than causation.  Although it is mentioned in both
the General Agreement and the Subsidies Code86, serious prejudice remains a
somewhat undeveloped concept.  It refers generally to a specific level of harm
to the domestic market, harm to exports to states with subsidized domestic
production and harm to exports which have been displaced in third markets by
subsidized goods.  The Agreement imposes more detailed requirements on the
serious prejudice test, including a 5% ad valorem subsidization level and the use
of market share to measure displacement of a product87.
Both the injury and serious prejudice tests represent the legalist view of
GATT.  Should a subsidy cause a certain level of harm, it will be deemed
actionable.  The Agreement's solution to the issue presented early in this article,
the competence of the GATT to evaluate the legitimacy of domestic policies, is
a unilateral judgment in favour of anti-distortion.
Jackson recommends that GATT values should be balanced with domestic
policy goals by a material injury test.  This is logical from a state sovereignty
perspective; why should foreign states have influence over subsidization in other
states if they themselves are not affected88?  However, such a view ignores the
fact that GATT rules do not flow from long-standing principles of natural
justice; they are a culmination of complex negotiations.  The GATT is not a
constitution; it is still merely a series of contracts from which parties can
withdraw at any time89.  As such, states should be able to protect their
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investment, whether or not the state has experienced material injury or merely
opportunity cost.  Certainly complainant states should not be forced to wait until
the damage has already been done90.  Conversely, the GATT should not protect
states from harm due to subsidization when there was no indication that the
subsidizing state was ever willing or actually able to eliminate the subsidy91.
This mixture of legalist and pragmatist triggers of a legalist outcome in the
Uruguay Round Agreement is theoretically inconsistent.  Nonviolation
nullification and impairment seeks to maintain reciprocity within limits set by
states themselves; injury and prejudice tests maintain specific standards of free
trade within absolute substantive, quantifiable limits.  Nonviolation nullification
and impairment protects reliance-induced conduct to strengthen existing
concessions92; injury and prejudice tests protect producers regardless of reliance
or of political feasibility.  Nonviolation nullification and impairment is
compensatory; injury and prejudice tests are punitive.
Nullification and impairment seems to be an additional indicator of an
actionable subsidy, yet it is unclear what kind of role it is intended to play.
Explication of violation nullification and impairment has relied on the existence
of violations of the GATT and therefore would appear unhelpful as an element
of the very test which attempts to determine which subsidies are GATT
violations.  Explication of nonviolation nullification and impairment seems
equally unhelpful :  as shown above, examination of reasonable expectations and
changes in competitive conditions is not compatible with injury and serious
prejudice tests.  In all likelihood, nullification and impairment will be glossed
over as litigants concentrate on the better known and understood injury and
prejudice components.  Nonviolation nullication and impairment, not only
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within the Subsidies Agreement and but also as a separate cause of action, will
probably continue to be virtually ignored by GATT members.
The result of such a mix of theoretical approaches is the loss of the benefit
of the pragmatic approach underlying nonviolation nullification and impairment.
The legitimacy of GATT panel decisions as well as their role as facilitators of
negotiated solutions and guardians of good faith compliance in GATT have been
annulled by the legalistic approaches of the injury and serious prejudice tests93.
Conclusion
The Uruguay Round Agreement is an ambitious attempt to impose a
predictable legal order on a group of sovereign states with a panoply of different
interests.  It represents a reaction of decades of complaints of the impotence of
the GATT in the face of recalcitrant nations.  However, the drafters seem to
have lost sight of the basic glue of any international order :  self-interest. 
 
«Codes are rules that apply between sovereign states and enforcement must rely
on recognition of a self-interest in seeing the rules work...A balance of self-
interest holds the GATT together.  The possibility that (a) specific trade
benefits given to a country will be removed through trade retaliation and/or (b)
the system as a whole will only stand a limited amount of disregard to agreed
rules before it comes crashing down are strong incentives to follow the rules.»94
GATT reform should emphasize the value of the GATT, especially in light of
past criticisms of its weakness.  It should portray the GATT as a mechanism
which encourages reciprocity and good faith by increasing external pressure on
states to keep their promises.  Reform should also avoid the brinksmanship
associated with strengthening rules which are difficult for states to follow
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consistently and aim to establish rules which are realistic and effective.
Nonviolation nullification and impairment accomplishes these goals.
However, the result of the new legalistic approach of the Uruguay Round
may have permanently buried pragmatism.  As the legalistic approach is a
reaction to the perceived failure of pragmatism, the failure of the new rules-
oriented GATT may only lead to a stronger push for legalism.  Efforts to
strengthen reciprocity and good faith would be replaced by the establishment of
a «Super-GATT» or a «GATT-plus» arrangement whereby trade liberalization
would only occur in a specific sector or between lesser numbers of states95.
Such an arrangement would be a radical departure from the current orientation
towards inclusiveness of developing nations and different sectors and may feed
the «growing dissatisfaction with multilateral trade negotiations...as a means of
achieving trade liberalization»96.  Centralized, unaccountable decision-making
might also raise fears of a democratic deficit similar to that experienced by the
European Community97.  By rejecting the pragmatic approach, the GATT has
chosen a new set of problematic questions which will only escalate in complexi-
ty and difficulty.
